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SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
VOLUME X FALL, 1956 NUMBER 4
LIFE INSURANCE AND COMMUNITY PROPERTY
IN TEXAS-REVISITED
by
Joe C. Stephens, Jr.*
p LAGIARISM is the chief stock in trade of the law review
writer; occasionally, it is bald and unashamed, more frequently
it is concealed, perhaps poorly, by mixing two or three previous
articles with a half dozen recent cases which themselves are mere
rehashes of the same articles and some earlier cases; sometimes
the writer's article is based on careful research and a painstaking
analysis of the ex cathedra pronouncements of the courts; and most
rarely of all the new work is truly original, presenting insights that
alter the course of the law. This attempt is of the bald and un-
ashamed type, and, in order that the writer's conscience may be
clear, he readily acknowledges that all he knows about life insur-
ance law has been culled from Professor W. 0. Huie's masterful
article in the Texas Law Review.' With unusual prefacing modesty,
it is now stated that Professor Huie can be credited with anything
worthwhile which appears here, but that all mistakes, errors, mis-
understandings and misinterpretations are this writer's own. The
only justification for this article is that the Supreme Court of Texas
has in the last decade decided several cases which probably
invalidate some of Professor Huie's conclusions.
Professor Huie approached the subject of life insurance and
community property from the viewpoint of the legal craftsman
eager to collate the cases, find a rational pattern in them, criticize
judicial aberrations that mar the pattern, and finally to provide
*A.B., Harvard University, 1938; LL.B. Harvard University, 1941; member of the
firm of Carrington, Gowan, Johnson, Bromberg & Leeds, Dallas, Texas.
1 Huie, Community Property Laws as Applied to Life Insurance, 17 TEXAS L. REV.
121 (1939) and 18 TEXAS L. Rrv. 121 (1940). For convenience, citations to Professor
Huie's article will hereafter be made as "17 HuIE" or "18 HuuE," followed by the
page number. References to Professor Huie or Huie throughout this article are based
on this writer's interpretation of Professor Huie's article and not on any private
conversation held with him; accordingly, such references may (and should) be
checked against the original.
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direction for future decisions. He was concerned primarily with the
technical job of fitting a new form of property, life insurance, into
the basic community property concepts. Logical orientation was
perhaps more important than sociological desirability; of course,
implicit in any argument is some social bias. This article is chiefly
concerned with the effect of the decisions on the family welfare
and is written on the assumption that Professor Huie's analysis of
legal concepts is sound and that following his suggestions will
produce desirable results.
BACKGROUND
Such results can be obtained only if the courts (or the legislature,
if necessary) recognize the basic problems. Community property
is merely one way of protecting the rights of the family, and, in
particular, the rights of the wife, but it happens to be the way that
Texas has chosen. It, like common law dower, was formulated when
all wealth was attributable directly to land. After Texas attained
its independence from Mexico the wife's inability to earn a living
upon termination of the marriage was recognized by (1) giving
her half the land acquired during the marriage, and (2) allowing
her, at least on the termination of the marriage by the death of the
husband, a lifetime right to occupy and use the homestead even if
it was the husband's separate property. In that agrarian culture,
the two hundred acre homestead provided her with a place to live
and with most of the necessities, if not the amenities, of life. A
few urban families, as well as landless couples, might suffer, but
the wife's community rights in other forms of property would tend
to alleviate this injustice, and in any event the problem was
de minimis.
The last century has witnessed not only rapid urbanization with
its consequent reduction of the "living" value of the homestead, but
also drastic changes in the actual forms of "property." Landed
wealth has given way to paper wealth, mere evidence of control
over property, labor, and goods; the day laborer (so far generally
without a guaranteed annual wage but with many unemployment,
old age and other similar benefits) has displaced the farmer. In
particular life insurance, which was virtually unknown in 1836,
is now the sole investment of many families. In fact, the face amount
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of life insurance in force has more than trebled in the decade
and a half since the publication of Professor Huie's article. If the
wife loses her interest in the family insurance, "community prop-
erty" is probably meaningless for 90% of Texas wives.2 Perhaps
even more dramatic are the possible adverse tax consequences
which may result from the failure to treat life insurance as prop-
erty, and in appropriate cases community property, but since these
affect only a small fraction of the populace, their social significance
is not too great.
Is LIFE INSURANCE PROPERTY?
Professor Huie's solution to this family problem was to recognize
life insurance (and not just some aspects of it, but the complete
bundle of rights) as property and as community property, and to
define the rights of the respective spouses in accordance with the
rules applicable to any other property, modified only to the extent
required by certain peculiar characteristics of life insurance! He
was critical of the cases whose results were based on the theory that
insurance was not property, and for a time it seemed that his argu-
ments were having some effect, as the following quotation from
Womack v. Womack4 indicates:
It is true that in the early decisions of the courts of this country,
including the decisions of the courts of this State, it was held in some
of them that policies of life insurance were not property. The history
of Article 4619, as amended, clearly shows that the Legislature intended
to give the term "community property" a broader meaning than it was
originally given.
Although the court then quotes with approval a number of state-
ments to the effect that insurance is property, it must be admitted
grudgingly that it limited both its own statement and its holding
to the cash surrender value of a policy upon divorce of the spouses,
and later cases certainly have not justified the optimism of those
2 The wife's rights under the community property system which can be enforced
against a recalcitrant husband must be distinguished from voluntary provisions by
the husband for the wife, which are an act of grace on his part.
' See 17 Huis 128 and his criticism of Martin v. McAllister, 94 Tex. 567, 63 S.W.
624 (1901) ; this is the thesis of the entire article.
4 141 Tex. 299, 172 S.W.2d 307, 308 (1943). Following the above quotation the
Court then repeats Justice Holmes' statement in Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149
(1911), that "life insurance has become in our days one of the best recognized forms
of investment and self-compelled saving. So far as reasonable safety permits, it is
desirable to give to life policies the ordinary characteristics of property."
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who felt that this case presaged a new attitude on the part of the
court.
Causes of the Problem
This difference of opinion between so learned a court and Pro-
fessor Huie is not without basis. There are several difficulties in
applying community property concepts to life insurance. The pecul-
iar nature of life insurance simply further complicates the well
known problems encountered in adjusting the theory of commun-
ity property to modern conditions. An initial difficulty is that, al-
though the community property system is of civil law origin, it has
been interpreted by lawyers trained solely in the common law, and
at least in the early days these lawyers had access to very few com-
mon law sources and even fewer civil law texts, all of the latter
being in a foreign language. The second difficulty is adjusting this
offspring of the marriage of civil and common law to the new forms
of property that have been spawned by the industrial revolution.
The courts have succeeded admirably in adapting what is essen-
tially a real property concept to a host of new entities (corporations,
complex trusts, unions), to new forms of property (stocks, bonds,
multifarious credit relations), and to new needs (principally secur-
ity in a wage-machine world), and this has shown great maturity
and flexibility on the part of our judges.
Flexibility has certainly been characteristic of the courts' deci-
sions with respect to the special requirements of insurance as com-
munity property, although a more apt characterization of the cases
in this field might substitute the word vacillation for flexibility.
Despite the fact that courts in a changing world must espouse change
and adopt flexibility, still the change must be predictable, the flex-
ibility rational. Minimum standards of stability demand some cer-
tainty in the rules of property, but such standards also require
change - change, however, that the social scientist and even the
thoughtful practicing attorney can foresee and plan for. Why is it
that a court whose decisions have generally met these standards
should flounder like a porpoise in a bathtub when it attempts to
reconcile life insurance to community property? The reasons that
seem most apparent are as follows:
(1) For practical purposes insurance is a creature of the last
[Vol. 10
1956] LIFE INSURANCE AND COMMUNITY PROPERTY 347
one hundred years, and its twentieth century importance dwarfs its
nineteenth century places. During this interval forms of insurance
have been multiplying, and its uses have changed, principally from
a "risk spreader" to a form of investment; in fact, life insurance
is now the primary device for forced saving. The early decisions
in most jurisdictions were largely concerned with term insurance, a
risk function like fire insurance. It is little wonder, therefore, that
nineteenth century courts were unable to perceive in it a new form
of property and accordingly felt compelled to classify life insur-
ance as merely a "non-property" contract after they had ceased to
be impressed with arguments that insurance policies might be illegal
bets on the insured's mortality. Today even the man on the street
knows that insurance is property; in truth, he probably knows that
it is his only property except a mortgaged car and household appli-
ances, but, of course, the man on the street has no reverence for
stare decisis.
(2) Most courts have also found their own prior pronounce-
ments intended for the protection of the insurer's contractual rights
difficult to reconcile with the property rights of husband and wife
inter se; and with the burgeoning of modern employer insurance
plans of various types, a similar problem is arising in differentiating
betwen the obligations assumed by the employer and the obligations
between the spouses with respect to the same insurance. It is, of
course, feasible to protect all interested third parties and at the
same time recognize certain marital property obligations. For ex-
ample, courts have protected banks in paying out deposits while
defending the rights of spouses in the same deposits. All parties
are entitled to such protection as can be extended to each without
substantial derogation from the rights of others.
(3) A contract problem also arises out of the right usually re-
served by the insured to change the beneficiary. Courts have cor-
rectly said that the beneficiary has no vested right until the death
of the insured or the release of the right of change itself.5 However,
5 Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Baker, 107 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Tex. 1952)
rev'd sub. nom. Kemp v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 205 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1953),
commenting, at page 2, on the husband's eliminating his wife as a beneficiary:
"[Wihere the insured reserves the right to change the beneficiary in [his life] policy,
the beneficiary therein obtains no vested interest in the proceeds of the policy prior to
the death of the insured." This is a fair statement of the law, but is completely irrele-
vant as to the wife's rights as a wife.
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saying that the wife as beneficiary has no vested interest is quite
different from saying that the wife as wife has no vested interest.
A different set of rules are and should be applicable to each situa-
tion, and the courts should carefully distinguish between the two
and not indiscriminately apply to one situation language which is
appropriate only with respect to the other.
(4) The testamentary characteristics of an insurance policy in
which the insured has reserved the right to change the beneficiary
have in some instances led the courts astray and have in other
instances been completely ignored.6 It is undeniable that the right
to change the beneficiary is an effective will substitute, although
certainly one that provides adequate safeguards to take it out of
the Statute of Wills, but it is equally undeniable that the husband-
insured would not be allowed to retain complete control of any
other community property or right to the date of his death and then
dispose of his wife's share of such property or right by will. If the
husband wishes to take care of the natural objects of his bounty
at his death, he need not do so out of his wife's share of any insur-
ance, but should be limited to his own part of the community prop-
erty, insurance and otherwise.
(5) Doubtless the courts have also been troubled by the fact
that usually, if the insured is living after the dissolution of the mar-
riage, it is necessary to continue to pay premiums in order to main-
tain the policy in force. While not quite so usual, the same fact is
true of realty which is being purchased under an installment con-
tract or is subject to purchase money mortgage. Furthermore, mod-
ern insurance, except pure term, has a number of facets which re-
quire no further payments, such as the cash surrender value and
the usual right to convert to a paid up policy or to accept extended
term insurance for a specified period, the duration of which is
determined by the cash value of the policy.
(6) Similar to the premium payment problem was the situation
created by Texas' unique position with respect to insurable interest,
which, contrary to the rule in most jurisdictions, required that there
6 See Martin v. Moran, 32 S.W. 904 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895). A testamentary analogy
was most appropriate in this instance because the policy itself provided that its pro-
ceeds were payable as the husband should by will direct. However, the difference
from the usual revocable inter vivos designation is not of substance, and in legal
effect it is identical with the designation of his estate as the beneficiary.
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be an insurable interest, not only at the inception of the policy, but
at its maturity.7 This has been directly troublesome in divorce cases,
but the idea may have obscured the courts' vision in other situations.
Of course, the fact that an ex-wife has no insurable interest in her
former husband's life should have no effect on other rights, such
as cash surrender value, which are not connected with his continued
life. It would seem, in principle, that the recent legislation on this
subject should at least correct some misapprehensions in this field.'
(7) Some decisions may also have been led astray by the courts'
attempt to protect the wife's interest in lump sum payments from
community creditors. Life insurance, as the bulwark of family se-
curity, has been especially sheltered by the legislature. By statute
the cash surrender value of life insurance which has been in force
two years or longer and which is payable to any member of the
insured's family is exempt from the claims of the insured's cred-
itors,9 and installment payments of the proceeds in favor of any
beneficiary are also exempt from the claims of creditors of both
the insured and the beneficiary.'0 Not to be outdone by the legislat-
ture, the judiciary has also held that the proceeds of a policy on
the husband's life payable in a lump sum to the wife are exempt
from the claims of community creditors on the theory that the pro-
ceeds are the wife's separate property which is not subject to the
community debts." It might have been more appropriate to leave
this decision to the legislature. There can be no academic quarrel
with a holding that such proceeds are the wife's separate property
since in one sense immediately after the dissolution of any marriage
all of the community property has become separate, but it is very
doubtful that the husband should retain control over this property
until the date of his death and at the same time obtain the benefits
of exemption of the proceeds from the claims of community cred-
7 See 17 Hum 140. Whiteselle v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 221 S.W. 575
(Tex. Comm. App. 1920).8 TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. (1925), INSURANCE ConE, art. 3.49-1, liberalizes the rules
with respect to insurable interest. Sec. 2 of that article certainly permits any person
to be designated by the insured as beneficiary and provides for a continuing insurable
interest thereafter.
9 TEx. Rev. Civ. STAT. (1925), art. 3 832a.
10 TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. (1925), INSURANCE CODE, art. 21.22. This statute was
enacted in 1927 and the statute cited in Note 8, supra, was enacted in 1929.
11 San Jacinto Bldg., Inc. v. Brown, 79 S.W.2d 164 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) error
re!; Davis v. Magnolia Petroleum Company, 134 S.W.2d 1042 (Tex. Comm. App. 1940).
Cf. Union Savings Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Smith, 62 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933)
error rel.
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itors when he has not complied literally with the legislative require-
ments for exemption, which are that the proceeds are to be subjected
to an installment option.
(8) While it would be hard to prove that the difficulty of valuing
insurance has affected the holding in any given case, it seems prob-
able that the courts have preferred to leave this problem to the
actuaries, and treating insurance as a mere contract usually avoids
the necessity for valuation. Life insurance, with the exception of
pure term insurance, has two aspects, one the risk factor and the
other the investment factor. Each premium pays partly for pure
insurance and partly for investment. The amount of the risk, how-
ever, decreases as the cash value of the policy increases until at
some point, either when the policy is paid up or endows, there is
either no more risk or the cash values already in the policy are
sufficient to carry it. A policy's "value" in the sense of normal
market values may also vary with outside factors such as the in-
sured's health or a change in the interest rate. Even pure term in-
surance may have great value if the insured has an incurable can-
cer. For the sake of simplicity, however, the courts have adhered
strictly to two values, the cash surrender value and the face amount
of proceeds. Methods of valuation are likely to assume increasing
importance in future decisions because of the tremendous number
of policies outstanding without cash values, particularly policies
acquired in connection with the employment of the insured, such
as group insurance or life insurance composing part or all of a
pension plan.
Confusion of the Courts
Most lawyers have felt that the principles advocated by Professor
Huie had been substantially approved by the Texas Supreme Court
because of the holdings of two cases decided in 19 4 3 .2 The first
12 The lawyers were not alone in this feeling. See Aaron v. Aaron, 173 S.W.2d 310
(Tex. Civ. App. 1943) error ref. w.o.m. The court was presented with a policy on the
husband's life taken out before marriage and paid for with separate funds before
marriage and community funds thereafter. The husband made the wife the beneficiary
and then changed the beneficiary to his mother, who together with the wife survived
him. The jury found (1) a gift of the policy by the husband to the community (a new
concept adopted in this and the Kemp case but which may be justified by the "passing"
theory of Sherman v. Roe, infra note 21) and (2) that the change of beneficiary
was a fraud on the wife. The court accordingly awarded the wife half the proceeds
and interpreted Womack v. Womack, infra, note 16, as holding that insurance was
community property. Kemp v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 205 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1953)
involved a policy taken out before marriage, paid for with separate funds before
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of these was Blackmon v. Hansen3 in which life insurance in the
amount of $110,000 was purchased during the marriage on the
life of the husband, payable on death to the wife. All premiums
were paid with community funds. The wife, who was also the inde-
pendent executrix of the husband's estate, paid taxes to the state
as if all of the insurance was includible in the estate and then sued
the tax collector for a refund of state inheritance tax on the theory
that one-half of the proceeds was her share of the community prop-
erty and not part of the estate of the husband, and accordingly that
inheritance taxes should be computed only on the husband's one-
half of such proceeds ($55,000) less the $40,000 exclusion for
insurance payable to a named beneficiary. The defendant contended
that the entire $110,000, subject of course to the $40,000 exclu-
sion, was taxable in the husband's estate. The court upheld the
plaintiff wife's contention, relying on: (1) the fact that the applic-
able state statute was taken from the federal statute on the basis
of which the United States Supreme Court had held that only one-
half of the proceeds of a policy issued on a husband's life under
similar circumstances was taxable in his estate, and (2) holdings
in some prior Texas cases that one-half of the proceeds of a policy
on the husband's life payable to his estate, all premiums on which
had been paid with community funds, is the property of the wife
and that such one-half is not part of the husband's estate. The court
did not criticize the cited Texas cases in any way, but, when at a
later date in Warthan v. Haynes,14 it became necessary to distinguish
the Blackmon case, the court stated that the rationale of that opinion
was the patterning of the Texas inheritance tax statute on the fed-
marriage and community funds thereafter, a possible gift of the policy to the com-
munity, a change of beneficiary to the wife after the marriage, and a later change
to the husband's sisters who together with the wife survived. Although the case was
remanded, the court interpreted the Texas cases as holding that insurance was property
and that any designation of a third party as a beneficiary was a prima facie fraud
on the wife and stated that no actual fraudulent intent need be established. Both this
case and Aaron v. Aaron evidently examined the total community property of the
spouses at the death of the husband to see whether or not the wife had been com-
pensated out of other property of the husband (community or separate). This policy
was provided by the husband's employer, Magnolia Petroleum Company, and the court
says that benefits under any retirement plan would seem to it to be community property.
Is 140 Tex. 536, 169 S.W.2d 962 (1943).
14 Warthan v. Haynes,.--........Tex......., 288 S.W.2d 481 (1956). This case
is the cause of this article. It will frequently be cited as the "Warthan case" without
further footnoting, despite the fact that the writer understands that law review articles
are classified as leading articles, middle articles, tail-end articles, and comments, solely
on the number of footnotes.
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eral act and that it could not be taken as in any sense a holding
with respect to the community nature of the proceeds of the policy."5
The Texas Supreme Court's most direct holding seemed to be
Womack v. Womack"' which involved four insurance policies, all
having cash values and all paid for with community funds; three
of the policies insured the husband's life with the wife as bene-
ficiary, and one was on the wife's life with the husband as bene-
ficiary. The parties were divorced in 1941 without mention of the
policies in the divorce decree, and in a subsequent suit the court
upheld the wife's right to obtain one-half of the amount by which
the cash surrender values of the policies on the husband's life ex-
ceeded the amount of the cash surrender value of the policy on the
wife's life. Although the court cited with apparent approval a num-
ber of statements to the effect that insurance was property, it limited
its holding and its own direct expression of opinion to the conclusion
that "the cash surrender value of the policies was community prop-
erty." In doing so, it expressly overruled Whiteselle v. Northwestern
Mutual Life Insurance Company 7 and cited Blackmon v. Hanseni"
for the proposition that one-half of the proceeds of an insurance
policy on the husband's life, paid for with community funds and
payable to his estate, are the property of the wife. In the Warthan
case the court backed water and called attention to the fact that
the holding in Womack v. Womack was limited solely to the cash
15 The Warthan case makes this distinction at page 484 and there cites Lang v.
Comm'r., 304 U.S. 264 (1938). This citation really introduces a type of renvoi because
the Federal statute obviously does not determine the ownership of the property but
relies on applicable state law for such determination. In the Lang case the Supreme
Court specifically referred to the law of the State of Washington, which clearly gives
the wife a community interest in the proceeds of policies, to determine whether or
not the entire proceeds should be included in the husband's estate. This creates the
anomaly of resting the interpretation of the Texas inheritance tax statute on the inter-
pretation of the federal law in a United States Supreme Court case which in turn was
based on the latter court's interpretation of the inheritance law of the State of
Washington.
16 141 Tex. 299, 172 S.W.2d 307 (1943).
1"221 S.W. 575 (Tex. Comm. App. 1920). The divorced wife sued the insurance
company for conversion of a policy on the life of her divorced husband whose status,
dead or alive, was not mentioned. She claimed a right to reimbursement of half of
either the premiums paid with community funds or the cash surrender value, but the
Commission of Appeals denied both, saying that the wife had no community interest
in the cash surrender values. Note that this suit was solely against the insurer and
could have been decided on the contractual rights of the company without reference
to the community property question, although the wife, who had lost her insurable
interest in the husband's life because of the divorce, had originally been irrevocably
designated as the beneficiary.
18 Supra note 13.
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surrender values which were not at issue in the Warthan case, and
rehabilitated the Whiteselle case, approving its philosophy except
as to the cash surrender value point.
The new course charted by the Blackmon and Womack decisions
was scarcely changed by Volunteer State Life Insurance Company
v. Hardin.9 There the husband took out certain policies during the
marriage, paid all the premiums with community funds, and desig-
nated his wife as primary beneficiary and their son as the alternate.
In 1940 the wife died intestate (the son inheriting) and subse-
quently the husband changed the beneficiary, designating his two
sisters, and died in 1944, leaving the son as one of his executors.
The son, in a suit which was formally an interpleader, claimed half
of the proceeds or, in the alternative, half of the cash surrender
value at the date of his mother's death. Although the court certainly
used some broad language (which it was later able to cite with
approval in holding that insurance was not property) to the effect
that the wife had no community interest in the proceeds, still its
holding that the son could recover neither the proceeds nor one-half
of the cash surrender value of the policies at his mother's death was
actually predicated not on this broad language but the following
grounds: first, that there was no showing that the wife's estate had
not received the equivalent value in the partition of the community
property, and second, that the cash surrender value had lapsed on
the death of the insured." Essentially, this holding was more than
justified on what for want of a better word might be called the laches
of the son. Of course, the son, or his mother's estate, actually may
have received other property equivalent to the cash value, but,
even if he had not received that value, he had an obligation to his
father to make an early claim. Had he done so, his father could
undoubtedly have arranged to provide for the sisters from other
assets of his estate.
Sherman v. Roe 1 is another case with an unexceptionable hold-
ing and some very exceptionable language. The husband had a
19 145 Tex. 245, 197 S.W.2d 105 (1946).
20 This concept of the lapse of the cash surrender value on the death of the insured
is largely fictional. Of course, no beneficiary would conceive of accepting the cash
surrender value when the entire proceeds could be had for the asking. All that has
happened is that the term part of the policy (in the amount of the difference between
the face amount of the policy and the cash surrender value) has matured and the
proceeds are merely the sum of the matured term portion plus the cash surrender value.
21153 Tex. 1, 262 S.W.2d 393 (1953).
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group accidental death policy which had been taken out on his life
before marriage, the amount of which, however, having been in-
creased after marriage. It seems clear that the premiums had been
paid with separate funds before the marriage and with community
funds thereafter. The policy was made payable to the wife, but
both husband and wife were killed in a common disaster under such
circumstances that it could not be determined who had survived. The
Court of Civil Appeals awarded the entire proceeds to the husband's
administrator on the ground that the wife's administrator could
not prove that she had survived, but the Supreme Court in a perfect
King Solomon decision awarded the proceeds equally to the es-
tates of the husband and the wife on the theory that such proceeds
were "community effects" on hand at the dissolution of the mar-
riage. The fact that the policy was taken out before marriage and
partly paid for with separate funds, and might therefore in whole
or in part be the separate property of the husband, was avoided by
the following clear statement: "Whatever rights to the proceeds of
the insurance might accrue to him [the husband] as his separate
property on account of his having procured the insurance for $2,000
before his marriage to Edna I. Roe or by his payment of pre-
miums before his marriage to her in our opinion passed to the
community when, after his marriage to Edna I. Roe, he paid the
premiums out of community funds, made her the beneficiary and
increased the amount to $9,000. "22 The Court does not amplify
this doctrine of "passing," but does say that after such passing the
policy became the equivalent of a policy taken out after marriage
and paid for entirely with community funds. The court managed to
say that "such a policy prior to the insured's death is not property
in which the wife owns an interest,"2 and it is at least arguable from
the language that the proceeds never became community property
but merely community effects.24 The Warthan case said that Sher-
22 262 S.W.2d at 397.
28 262 S.W.2d at 396. The court also said at page 397, "Petitioner's claim to one-half
of the proceeds of the certificate of insurance herein cannot be sustained on the theory
that the certificate was community property and consequently the proceeds must be
community property." This position might be acceptable if the doctrine of apportion-
ment is discarded and if the court's own "passing" theory is ignored.
24 The terms common eflects and common property (never community property)
are used in TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. (1925), art. 4619, which defines the community
estate and which should place the burden of proof on any party contending that any
property acquired during marriage is the separate property of either spouse.
[Vol. i0
1956] LIFE INSURANCE AND COMMUNITY PROPERTY 355
man v. Roe's holding would be limited strictly to its facts (simul-
taneous death) and cited with approval the "no property" language.
Warthan v. Haynes
The ultimate bombshell was delivered in Warthan v. Haynes,
25
not only because of its holding and the dicta therein, but also be-
cause it is apparent from the dissent that the basic problems received
the court's attention. 2' The majority and the minority were both well
acquainted with Professor Huie's article, but the "literal terms of
the contract" group won out over the community property dissenters.
The facts are simple. The husband and wife, who had no "com-
munity" children, but each of whom had children by prior mar-
riages, died intestate in a common disaster, the husband surviving
his wife by fifteen to thirty minutes. There were three policies on
the husband's life, one a group accident policy taken out during
the marriage and paid for with community funds, the second a
group life policy also taken out during the marriage and bought
with community funds, and the third an ordinary life policy taken
out long before the present marriage and paid for with community
funds only since the marriage. The wife was the beneficiary of
each policy, and for all practical purposes the husband's estate
was the alternative beneficiary of each. The dispute was between
the respective administrators of the husband and wife. The Court
of Civil Appeals had held that the proceeds of the two group poli-
cies were community property and that the proceeds of the ordinary
life policy should be divided between the community estates and
the husband's separate estate.27
The majority of the Supreme Court awarded the proceeds of all
three policies to the husband's separate estate without any right
of reimbursement to the community for funds used to pay pre-
miums. The court expressly declined to discuss the wife's right,
if any, in the cash surrender value since no such contention had
been made in the trial court. The Supreme Court relied heavily
25 Supra note 14.
26 So far as the writer knows, no amicus curiae briefs were filed, although R. N.
Gresham of San Antonio wrote to the Clerk of the Supreme Court a letter dated March
28, 1956 (before rehearing was denied), deploring the holding, chiefly from the
tax viewpoint.
27 Haynes v. Warthan, 272 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
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on Volunteer State Life Insurance Company v. Hardin, interpreting
that previously innocuous decision to mean that life insurance on
the life of the husband prior to his death "is not property in which
the wife owns an interest," and careful study of the cases does
not indicate that it was thinking only of the proceeds. It limited
Sherman v. Roe to instances of simultaneous death, saying that in
the Warthan case the policy had not matured at the time of the
wife's death and so could not be "community effects" on hand at
the dissolution of the marriage. The court also reaffirmed Martin
v. McAllister,"8 Professor Huie's bete noir, and that case's view
that insurance is not property, just a contract. The court further
said that Blackmon v. Hansen was merely a tax decision based
solely on statutory interpretation.29 Its most shocking pronounce-
ment was its statement that the basis for the holding in Martin v.
Morans0 might well be that "under certain circumstances" a hus-
band's making a policy payable to his estate was a fraud on his
wife. Protecting the wife through the doubtful legal device of
denominating the husband's action as fraud would seem poor rec-
ompense for the wife's contribution to the community or for the
husband's attitude toward his spouse.
Judge Garwood's dissent would give to the community the pro-
ceeds of both group policies and to the husband's estate the pro-
ceeds of the ordinary life policy subject to the requirement that
it reimburse the community for the premiums paid with commun-
ity funds. He recognizes that the majority's opinion has some sup-
port in the cases, but he thinks that the court should base its de-
cision on the fact that the policy, the entire policy and not just
28 94 Tex. 567, 63 S.W. 624 (1901). The wife died leaving a husband and several
children. The dispute concerned the proceeds of a policy, whose face amount evidently
exceeded $5,000, on the wife's life payable to the husband. The court recognized the
husband's control over the community subject only to the fraud limitations and, in
holding for the husband, said that a policy becomes property only upon the death of
the insured in the lifetime of the payee, and that the proceeds were not acquired
during the marriage but were received by the husband after the wife's death. Of course,
the proceeds were in a sense available simultaneously with her death and if the time
factor is important Sherman v. Roe should be a contrary holding. In addition to
criticizing the language of the court, Professor Huie particularly objects to the hus-
band's making a gift to himself of community property, directly or indirectly, there
being no evidence that the wife had in any way consented to the insuring of her life
or the beneficiary designation. It is, of course, difficult to imagine her not consenting
to the procuring of the insurance, since it is improbable that the policy was issued
without a physical examination.
29 See note 15, supra.
so Supra note 6.
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the cash surrender value as in the Womack case, is property, and,
of course, if it meets the necessary tests, that it is community prop-
erty. Implicit in this dissent, although not clearly articulated, is the
theory that, since the entire policy (each group policy in this case)
with all of its rights is community property, then upon the death
of the wife prior to the death of the husband, one-half of the policy
itself and one-half of all of its rights actually become the property
of the wife's estate; and since the policy happened to mature before
any other arrangements could be made, one-half of the proceeds
belong to the estate of the wife, following the ownership (equitable
presumably) of her one-half of the policy. While it would be un-
fair to claim that any previous decision had gone this far, such a
holding would certainly be a logical result of the doctrine that
insurance is property, if, as we think entirely possible, the insurable
interest problem has now been cured.
If we assume that the husband survives by several years instead
of several minutes, a different disposition of any "community pol-
icy" would usually be worked out, such as permitting him to pur-
chase the policy for its cash value, but there is nothing inherently
wrong in allowing the wife's estate to continue to own one-half of
the policy if her next-of-kin or legatees wish to do so and are willing
to continue to pay the premiums. Insofar as the insurer is concerned,
it actually does not care so long as its liabilities do not exceed those
which it has promised to meet, and yet solicitude for the insurer
is evidently at the root of the objection of those in the contract
camp."' The only valid objection might arise, not from the insuring
company, but from an employer which provides policies as part
of its employee benefit plans. Of course, in the ecnomic sense the
employee pays even those premiums through his labor (no one now
doubts that such benefits are part of the employee's compensation)
but the employer puts the cash on the line, and the only feasible
way to protect the employee-husband if the wife's estate took over
31 This overldoks one insurance company practice. A number of companies do issue
preferred risk policies which are generally limited to some minimum amount, frequently
$10,000, and carry a lower premium. Division of such a policy between two or more
persons (the husband and the wife's estate or her heirs) would increase a company's
cost in handling such policies. However, objections from the companies on this ground
is unlikely since it would arise in relatively few cases and can be eliminated through
actuarial computations of the cost of the policy.
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one-half of the policy would be for the estate to reimburse him
directly for the value of one-half of the premiums."
Probable Results
A practicing lawyer may unreasonably desire to know the
present state of the law in order to advise a client of his rights and
obligations (tax and otherwise) with respect to his life insurance.
For this purpose, let us follow the order of Professor Huie's article,
assuming in each instance that the policy was taken out during mar-
riage and the premiums paid with community funds.
(1) Policy on the husband's life payable to his estate and the
wife is living at his death. Probably, under Sherman v. Roe the
proceeds are community property or effects since they were on
hand at the date of death. However, the Warthan case contains
language which might indicate a possibility that such proceeds are
the husband's separate property unless there is fraud on the
husband's part, although of course legal fraud might be found
merely from the form of beneficiary designation.
(2) Policy on the husband's life payable to his estate and the
wife predeceases him. These are the Warthan case facts and there
seems to be no question that in the absence of fraud the policy
is then the separate "something or other" of the husband. It would
seem to make no difference whether the wife was named as the
primary beneficiary with the husband's estate as the secondary
beneficiary, or whether his estate alone was named as the primary
beneficiary, except that it would be almost impossible to uncover
a fraud on the wife if she were named as the primary beneficiary.
The question of the rights of the wife's estate to half of the cash
surrender value is an open one, although the Womack and Sherman
cases should in principle entitle her estate to half the cash surren.
82 Cl. Lee v. Lee, 112 Tex. 392, 247 S.W. 828 (Tex. Comm. App. 1923) ; Kemp v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., supra note 12. Both of these cases recognized the wife's
rights in employer benefit or retirement plans, the former apparently uninsured and
the latter insured. The employer's objection would be that it was not obtaining
the full benefit, in terms of employee loyalty, of the premiums paid by it on the
policy or to the plan if one-half of the benefits would ultimately go to someone other
than the employee-husband or his heirs; this objection is more than outweighed by
the fact that in most instances the loyalty of the wife has been bought with such fringe
benefits and that the wife's loyalty strengthens the husband's. It is not uncommon to
hear a man say that he would leave his present employment for more lucrative work
but that his wife objects to his foregoing his present retirement and related benefits.
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der value since it is evidently property and was on hand at the
dissolution of the marriage.
(3) Policy on the husband's life payable to the wife who sur-
vives the husband. It would seem that the proceeds are still the
separate property of the wife and that the proceeds are exempt
from the claims of community creditors in the absence of fraud.
Using as a point of departure the legislative intent as expressed
in the statute exempting such proceeds only when they are pay-
able on an installment basis, it is arguable that community credi-
tors should be able to reach such proceeds; for logically in view
of the testamentary nature of the disposition (i.e. the husband's
retention of control until his death) all that has happened is that
the proceeds, which are a product of community property, have
been given by the husband to the wife (at least as to his half)
at the time of his death. The law, however, appears to be other-
wise.
(4) Policy on the wife's life payable to the husband. Despite
Professor Huie's criticism, Martin v. McAllister seems to have
taken on new life since the majority in the Warthan case expressly
approved it. Accordingly, at least on the death of the wife, the
proceeds of such a policy are the husband's separate property,
even though the wife may not have consented, and possibly could
not have consented, to such a gift and even though the husband,
as manager of the community, has thoughtfully managed a gift
to himself. This gift might not be of "property," but most of us
would consider it rather valuable.
(5) Policy on the husband's life payable to a third party."
There are no cases which would materially change Professor
83 No case has been found involving insurance on the wife's life payable to a third
party; probably the reason for this is that the husband as manager of the community
would certainly have consented at least to the procurement of the policy, and he is
normally the only person who could complain. There are three exceptions to this.(1) The wife is manager of the special community, that is, the fruits of her own labor
and the income from her separate property, and as a lot of us can testify, she may
frequently be the de facto, if not the de jure manager of the general community and
as such she might easily procure such insurance without the husband's consent. (2)
The husband might procure a large policy on the wife's life payable, say, to her step-
children (presumably his children by a prior marriage), thus converting all of the
community property to insurance and laying the groundwork for a dispute between
the parties entitled to the wife's estate and the beneficiaries. (3) The wife as insured
secretly changes the beneficiaries on a policy taken out on her life by her husband. The
same principles governing the insurance on the husband's life payable to a third party
should be applicable to a case arising under any of the three foregoing exceptions.
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Huie's conclusions on this question" and it would seem still to
depend on the fraud issue which in turn involves (a) intent, (b)
size of the gift in relation to the size of the community estate, 5
(c) the relationship of the beneficiary-donee to the husband or
wife and perhaps the financial needs of the donee, and (d) the
possibility of the wife's being compensated for her loss out of
her husband's share of other community property or his separate
property -the compensation theory apparently having been
approved in Volunteer State Life Insurance Company v. Hardin.
(6) Proceeds during the life of both spouses. Normally such
proceeds are community, although in certain instances of irre-
vocable designation of the wife as beneficiary (and obviously in
the event of a complete assignment of the policy and all incidents
of ownership therein to the wife) such proceeds would be her
separate property as a gift from her husband. If the wife can
make a similar gift of "community property" (her right to do
so seems improbable) then the husband could also receive the
proceeds as his separate property under similar circumstances.
(7) Divorce of the Spouses. Womack v. Womack has certainly
clarified the rights of the parties on divorce. The cash surrender
value is community property, each spouse being entitled to half
thereof subject, of course, to the equity powers of the divorce
court. The policy itself usually becomes the property of the
insured, subject, of course, to a lien or some other right in favor
of the other spouse for half the cash surrender value; however,
although no case has ever raised the issue because of the lack
of insurable interest in the divorced spouse, if that difficulty has
84 Cf. Kemp v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., supra, note 12. The court said
that any designation of a third party was prima facie or presumptively fraudulent on
the basis that the wife is entitled to the protection of Tax. REV. CIV. STAT. (1925),
Art. 3996, governing fraudulent conveyances. What proof would be required to rebut
this presumption?
85 A subsidiary problem involves the determination of the effective date of the
gift, which might be either (a) when each premium is paid or (b) when the incidents
of ownership are surrendered by the husband, or (c) when the proceeds become pay-
able. The individual premium will usually be small compared with the community
estate, whereas the face amount of the policy may be relatively large. Unless we accept
the view hereinafter urged that one-half of the proceeds should belong to the wife
if the husband reserves the right to change the beneficiary until his death, without
reference to any fraud at all, then the time to make the comparison of the gift to the
total estate to determine the existence of "fraud" under "the gift of a substantial
part of the estate" theory should certainly be the death of the husband, if he reserves
the right to change the beneficiary until that time.
[Vol. 10
1956] LIFE INSURANCE AND COMMUNITY PROPERTY 361
been avoided by the new Texas statute, there is no logical reason
why each spouse could not continue to own one-half of the policy
itself.
No point will here be made with respect to the right of the
respective spouses in policies which were separate in origin,
usually because purchased before marriage, but have been paid
for partly with separate funds and partly with community funds.
The cases we have discussed throw little light on Professor Huie's
suggestion of apportionment. This theory was adopted by the
Court of Civil Appeals in the Warthan case, but was, of course,
not decided by the Supreme Court; the dissenting judges indi-
cated that the community estate should be reimbursed for the
premiums paid, which would amount to a denial of the appor-
tionment theory. Neither apportionment nor reimbursement is
perfect; reimbursement presents problems because the community
is regaining in full something that has been consumed in part,
that is, the protection afforded against the risk of death, which
is the principal element in term insurance but which becomes
smaller and smaller as higher premium policies are considered.
Apportionment presents actuarial difficulties,8" but it is probably
the fairest result economically, and Professor Huie has made
a strong argument for it on a theoretical legal basis. The "pass-
ing" theory of Sherman v. Roe can hardly be thought to have
wide applicability if indeed it will ever again be used without
at least some window dressing.
TAx ASPECTS
What are the tax implications of the Warthan case? The Tax
Court's decision in The Chase National Bank v. Commissioner7
is illustrative of the problem. In that case the husband had set
36 These difficulties are similar to (but different in effect from) those encountered
under the reimbursement theory. Assume an ordinary life policy in force for forty
years, twenty years prior to the marriage and twenty thereafter. The policy would
be half community and half separate on the apportionment theory. The actuarial risk
of death has increased each year although the amount of risk underwritten by the
insurer has decreased each year. However, the premiums paid during marriage are
smaller because of the purchase at an early age. The cash surrender normally increases
at a progressively greater rate during the later years, partly because the earlier cash
values are actually earning a return which is reflected in the increased value of the
policy, and partly because the amount at risk is smaller. Older policies were usually
written on less favorable mortality tables but on more favorable interest rates. It is
still probable that apportionment is the most equitable method of division.
87 25 T. C. No. 74 (1955).
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up a trust of which Chase was the successor trustee. The corpus
of the trust was composed solely of life insurance policies on
the life of the husband taken out during the marriage and paid
for entirely with community funds. The trust became irrevocable
on the husband's death and thereafter the income was payable
to the wife with remainders over to designated parties. The wife,
who survivd the husband, accepted the trust, and, omitting certain
transferee problems, the issue was whether or not the wife had
made a gift of her half of the proceeds. The Tax Court, interpret-
ing the Texas cases better than most Texas lawyers, held that she
had made no gift, citing several decisions establishing that, while
the wife had a community interest in the cash surrender value
during the marriage itself, on the termination of the marriage
by the death of the husband she had no interest in proceeds pay-
able to a named beneficiary (here the trust) and that the cash
surrender value had disappeared into thin air on the death of the
husband. The Tax Court said, "The distinction may appear to
be a bit unusual, but we must take the law of Texas as we find it.
Until the Texas courts indicate otherwise, we must assume that
the foregoing cases correctly estaiblsh the law of Texas..."
Of course, consistent application of the logic of this case requires
that at the death of the husband the entire proceeds of the policies
payable to the insurance trust be included in his estate for estate
tax purposes. The holding as to the insurance trust is to be con-
trasted with a contrary holding in the same case concerning an
identical trust except that the corpus was composed of com-
munity securities; the difference in the corpus alone induced the
court to hold that the wife had made a gift of her one-half of the
securities, less the actuarial value of the life estate she retained.
This means that on the Warthan facts, the husband having sur-
vived by fifteen minutes, his estate should pay an estate tax on
the entire proceeds. Furthermore, some fantastic results can be
reached if we accept the dictum in the Warthan case to the effect
that the rationale of Martin v. Moran,3" holding that proceeds pay-
able to the husband's estate upon dissolution of the marriage by
his death are community, might be based upon the fact that such
38 Supra note 6.
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a beneficiary designation is fraudulent as against the wife. For
example, the husband dies leaving a policy payable to his estate
and, in a frequently used estate plan, provides by his will for a
testamentary trust, the income payable to his wife for life with
a special power of appointment in the wife or a gift over to the
children of the marriage. On these facts it would be difficult to
detect any fraud against the wife, and accordingly the entire
proceeds might fall into the testamentary trust and be taxable
in the estate of the husband. Examples could be multiplied, but
the reader's patience must be exhausted, and such nightmares will
be left to each individual's own imagination. Of course, it is sub-
mitted that no such holding would ever be made by the Supreme
Court of Texas and that the doctrine of Sherman v. Roe, that the
proceeds were community effects on hand at the dissolution of the
marriage, would automatically be applied, thus eliminating the
search for fraud, legal or otherwise. However, the Warthan facts
alone probably put Texas in the unfavorable position of separate
property states where the most careful tax planning requires that
the husband die prior to his wife's death (actuarially he prede-
ceases her two out of three times) in order not to lose the marital
deduction. 9 The Chase National Bank holding also means that
wherever a third party is named as a beneficiary of a policy on
the husband's life the entire proceeds must be included in his
estate for estate tax purposes unless we are fortunate enough to
convict the dead of fraud.
The estate planner must solve these problems. What can he do?
89 Conceivably Texas could be in a less favorable position than a common law state.
Presumably if the Texas husband predeceases his wife and the proceeds of a life
insurance policy on his life, paid for solely with community funds, are payable to his
wife, his estate is entitled to a marital deduction if the proceeds of the insurance policy
are considered as his separate property. Yet this presumption runs afoul of the terms
of INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056 (c) (2) (B), which provide that the adjusted gross
estate shall be determined by subtracting from the gross estate, among other community
property items, "the amount receivable as insurance under policies on the life of the
decedent, to the extent purchased with premiums or other consideration paid out of
property held as such community property." A literal reading of that language would
exclude the proceeds as above stated from the benefits of the marital deduction, but
the intent of Congress was obviously merely to exclude what was actually "community
life insurance." See the report of the Senate Finance Committee, 1948-1 Cum. BULL.
344. Furthermore, Rev. Rul. 232, 1953-2 CUM. BULL. 268, construes the identical pro-
vision of the 1939 Code in accordance with Congressional intent rather than on the
literal terms of the statute, and presumably the rationale of this ruling would result
in treating the proceeds in our hypothetical case as eligible for the marital deduction.
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Probably he will use the partition statute. 40 First, two identical
policies will be taken out, one owned by the husband and one by
the wife, both on his life, and the premiums will be paid by
husband and wife respectively with separate funds resulting from
a partition of community funds. Of course, this partition gambit
must be repeated annually. Or it may be possible merely to buy
two identical policies, one owned by the wife and the other by
the husband, and pay for each with community funds. There
should be no gift tax in this situation since we have an even swap,
but the question arises as to whether the wife has the power to
give away community funds. 1 Then who or what should be desig-
nated as the beneficiary? Perhaps the only safe designation except
the wife herself is an appropriately drafted insurance trust. The
tax lawyer is already looked on as a necromancer by the general
public and all this black magic will do nothing to change the
impression. This may also speed up a trend, which has been
growing in recent years, toward a complete transfer of the own-
ership of policies; many conservative lawyers deplore this ten-
dency, but they may now be helpless despite the undesirable
effects resulting from such transfers.
This bleak picture has its brighter aspects. Every practicing
attorney has been faced with the horror-stricken look on the face
of some successful husband who has learned for the first time that
on his death his wife, whom he loves dearly but whose business
judgment he trusts not at all, will own one-half of "his" prop-
erty to do with as she pleases. That "do with" has dire connota-
tions in his imagination. For various reasons he is unwilling to
put his insurance on settlement options. Now we can tell him
(or can we?) that he can set up a revocable trust like The Chase
National Bank insurance trust and be certain of at least a lifetime
of protection for his wife and even a gift over to his children if
40 TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. (1925), art. 4624 (a), which was enacted in 1949, permits
spouses to partition community property by a procedure which is relatively simple if
the partition is of equal undivided interests. Thereafter, the interest of each spouse
is separate property.
41 Section 2 of Art. 4624 (a), supra note 40, specifically provides that the partition
shall not be construed as restricting the right of the husband to make a gift of com-
munity property to the wife. Omission of similar language with respect to the wife
would indicate that she does not have the same right. This would not bother us if
we could know that the proceeds of a policy on the husband's life were his separate
property, but the Supreme Court's position is sufficiently tentative so that the wife
might end up owning %Y of the proceeds instead of %.
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he is willing to pay the tax consequences. This penalty may not be
too frightening in small to medium estates.
In addition to the fact that the attorney cannot now with
assuredness advise his client of the tax or substantive law rules
governing community life insurance, there are more significant
dangers. The modern urban family, particularly of the lower
and middle income groups, is depending more and more heavily
on life insurance for family security. In fact, a pension plan and
a GI home, supplemented with Social Security and individual life
insurance, are the family property. If we do not strictly adhere
to the view that life insurance is community property, discarding
any idea that the insurance is the separate property of the husband
which he may leave to a third party, we may unwittingly be
junking the entire system and irreparably harming many wives
whose contributions to the family welfare, this writer naively
believes, are just as great as those of her husband. The tax conse-
quences are also grave. Normally, however, the family with a
tax problem will consult an attorney who is expected to formulate
a plan which will avoid the pitfalls, but the lawyer's task has
been immeasurably increased with a resulting increase in expense.
Furthermore, there are any number of wealthy persons who fail
to have their estates planned and who will fall into tax traps.
Perhaps all of this could be overlooked except for the inescapable
conclusion that these problems could readily be solved by our
courts, although one might imply from the Warthan case that this
capability is not being realized.
CONCLUSION
Whether there are clear answers to all of the problems dis-
cussed in this article cannot now be said. The Tax Court has left
their solution to the Texas courts. Because of the intricacies of
the subject, the Texas courts in turn may prefer to refer the
problems to the legislature; however, the writer feels these are
matters for judicial interpretation, particularly since the legisla-
ture has not been conspicuously successful in its dealings with
community property. It is submitted that the most obvious diffi-
culties could be avoided by adherence to three propositions: (1)
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That each and every policy and all of its attributes are property"
and to the extent taken out during marriage and paid for with
community funds are community property; for this purpose an
employer's payment of premiums during the marriage should be
considered community contributions, since they are as much a
part of the employee's salary as his take home pay or his with-
holding tax. (2) That the husband's retention of the incidents
of ownership until his death, particularly the right to change the
beneficiary, renders any beneficiary designation essentially a
testamentary act, and accordingly the husband may not dispose
of his wife's half by any beneficiary designation, whether to his
estate or any third party, any more than he may dispose of her
half of any other community property by will.4 (3) That the
insurable interest statute should be interpreted as giving the
divorced wife, or the deceased wife's estate or her heirs, an insur-
able interest in the husband's life." To these basic propositions
might be added some other rules such as Professor Huie's sugges-
tion that apportionment be applied to determine the ownership
42 Recognizing life insurance as property at all times and for all purposes would
be the selection of one of two conflicting lines of authority running through the cases.
See also note 31, supra.
48 Such a holding would reverse prior authorities, but the reversal would not be
as substantial a change as would at first appear if the designation of a third party as
a beneficiary is presumptively fraudulent as indicated in Kemp v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., supra note 12. Other states so hold. The Washington cases deny the husband
practically all power to give away community property, including life insurance, and
California by statute has adopted the same rule unless the wife consents in writing,
and the statute has been applied to life insurance. See 18 Hum 123-26. The rule could
be limited to testamentary gifts in Texas without defeating any reasonable family plans,
since the husband can still make appropriate provisions out of his half of the com-
munity, particularly if the courts also adopt the view that permits third party bene.
ficiary designations to stand if the wife has been compensated therefor out of other
property, separate or community, belonging to the husband.
44 Such an interpretation would be no tour de force. Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. (1925),
INSURANCE CODE, art. 3.49.1, provides that if the insured has in writing designated
any person as beneficiary or owner of a policy either in an application or an appro-
priate change of beneficiary form, then thereafter the person so designated shall always
have an insurable interest. Certainly once the wife has been designated as a beneficiary
by the husband she has a permanent insurable interest. If she has not been so desig-
nated, then does she have an insurable interest after divorce? It is submitted that
she does because (a) the requirement that the designation be in writing is merely
precautionary and (b) the husband has used the wife's funds for half the premiums
both as a statutory trustee and as a resulting or constructive trustee. Furthermore,
the statute in effect does away with the old Texas insurable interest rule as to any
policy actually applied for by the insured. It would not seem too far fetched to say
that if the insured uses a stranger's funds to purchase a policy on his life, the stranger
(or his heirs, etc.) could trace the funds and even recover the entire proceeds if the
insured had died meanwhile. Should the wife or her heirs, who are at the mercy of
the husband, receive less consideration than the total stranger?
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of insurance which is partly separate and partly community rather
than merely reimbursing the community, and that the existence
of fraud (if based on the test that any gift is fraudulent if it
constitutes a substantial portion of the community estate) be
determined in relation to the face amount of the policy rather
than the amount of each individual premium payment. The three
basic propositions would, however, tend to equate insurance with
other community property. The writer realizes some of the com-
plexities and has tried to avoid some of the omniscience of the
law review writer from whose obiter dicta there is no more appeal
than from similar dicta by the Supreme Court. With that approach
it can only be said that a reorientation along the lines here sug-
gested might be helpful.
